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Abstract
Protected module architectures, like the recently launched Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (Intel SGX), make it possible to protect individual
software modules of an application against attacks from other modules of
the application, or from the operating system. But if the code of the pro-
tected module (the enclave in Intel SGX terminology) has vulnerabilities
itself, that module can still be exploitable. Programming enclaves in a
safe programming language can prevent a wide range of vulnerabilities
within the enclave.
However, the simple approach of programming enclaves in a safe pro-
gramming languages gives less security guarantees than one might expect.
A safe language only provides safety guarantees for whole programs, not
for individual modules that are part of a bigger program. If the context
of the module is malicious, additional defensive measures are required to
guarantee the safety of the enclave. This paper illustrates this problem,
and reports on work-in-progress towards a solution.
1 Introduction
Software systems are often attacked by exploiting low-level details of their im-
plementation. Attacks that exploit memory safety errors are an obvious example
[EYP10]: by triggering a memory safety bug in a C or C++ program, the pro-
gram writes to memory cells that it is not supposed to write to, and the effect of
this memory corruption depends on low-level details of the compiler, operating
system and hardware. By carefully choosing inputs sent to the program, the
attacker can often make the program misbehave.
But also more recent attacks like memory scraping [Huq15] are an example:
an attacker that can compromise the operating system can exfiltrate secret in-
formation (e.g. keys or credit card information) by scanning the virtual memory
space of applications running on the operating system.
An important defense against memory corruption attacks are safe program-
ming languages like Java, Scala or Rust [MK14]. For an attacker model where
the attacker can interact with a complete program by providing input and by
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reading output, such safe languages provide complete protection against mem-
ory corruption. Roughly speaking, a safe language ensures this by making sure
that behavior of programs is always well-defined whatever input the attacker
provides, thus making it impossible for the program to run into undefined be-
havior that might be implementation-dependent and potentially dangerous.
An important defense against memory scraping attacks are protected mod-
ule architectures [MPP+08, SP12, NAD+13], now also supported in recent In-
tel processors through the new Intel Software Guard Extensions, Intel SGX
[Int14, MAB+13]. For an attacker model where the attacker can control all
infrastructural software, including the operating system and language runtime
libraries, a protected module architecture can execute a software component
in a protected module (called enclave in Intel SGX). Execution as a protected
module provides strong assurance that only a module’s code can access that
module’s memory, thus countering memory scraping attacks [CBB+01, SYP+09]
and many other layer-below attacks.
These two defense mechanisms, safe languages and protected module ar-
chitectures, complement each other well: protected module architectures limit
what a malicious context can do to a software module, and language safety
avoids memory safety vulnerabilities within a module. This paper reports on
work in progress on the combination of these two mechanisms. We show how
a module that is programmed in a safe language and executes in an enclave
can still be subject to low-level attacks that exploit implementation details and
can cause memory corruption within the module. This is due to the fact that
a software module within an enclave may offer a richer API than just input
and output of primitive values (like integers or strings). Methods or functions
callable from the malicious context might also return (or accept as parameters)
references to mutable objects, or function pointers.
The objective of our work is to extend the notion of safety to handle these
additional cases: we investigate what defensive measures a compiler must take
to ensure that a protected module that is written in a safe language never runs
into undefined behavior. Note that this problem is related to – but different
from – fully abstract compilation [Aba99], and safe language interoperability
[MF07]. We discuss the similarities and differences in Section 5.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, in Section 2, we
briefly recap the two mechanisms, language safety and protected module archi-
tectures, which we combine in this paper. Section 3 shows that the straight-
forward combination of these two does not give us safe enclaves: enclaves pro-
grammed in a safe language can still be unsafe in the sense that they can run
into undefined, hence implementation-dependent, behavior. Section 4 infor-
mally sketches the additional checks a compiler should do to ensure safety, and
outlines the status of this work in progress. Finally, in Sections 5 and 6, we
discuss related work and conclude.
We emphasize that this paper reports on work in progress. We illustrate
problems and solutions informally. A full formalization and implementation of
the ideas in this paper is future work.
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2 Background
2.1 Safe languages
Safe languages, like Java or C#, avoid implementation-dependent behavior and
hence also any kind of attack that exploits such implementation-dependent be-
havior, including memory corruption attacks, by ensuring that the execution
of programs is always well-defined. Examples of program constructs that could
lead to undefined behavior include (1) accessing an array out of bounds (a spa-
tial memory safety error), (2) accessing memory that has been deallocated (a
temporal memory safety error), or (3) treating a data pointer as a function
pointer (a type safety error).
Safe languages use a combination of compiler-enforced bounds checks (to
counter spatial memory safety errors), automatic memory management (to
counter temporal memory safety errors) and type checking (to counter type
safety errors) to make sure that no program can ever run into such undefined
behavior. Many safe languages compile to a virtual machine (like the Java
Virtual Machine), but there is currently a growing interest in more C-like lan-
guages that compile to machine code and give the programmer more control
over memory management, while still providing substantial safety guarantees.
A prototypical example is the Rust programming language [MK14], strongly
influenced by the Cyclone language [JMG+02].
Programming language safety is well understood [Pie02], but new challenges
arise if such languages are used to build protected modules, as we will show
further in the paper.
For this work-in-progress report, we will use a simple safe single-threaded
dialect of C that supports global variables that are module-private (like static
global variables in C), top-level function definitions, and type safe function
pointers (like C# delegates). The only types are integers, the void type and
function types. Section 3 contains examples of programs in this language. For-
malizing the syntax and semantics of the language is straightforward.
2.2 Protected Module Architectures
Protected Module Architectures [MPP+08, MLQ+10, SP12] are a relatively
recent countermeasure to protect software modules against attacks from the
software context in which a module executes. This context includes both other
modules of the program as well as higher privileged infrastructural software
such as the operating system. They have been designed both for higher-end
processors [MPP+08, SP12] – Intel’s most recent Skylake processors provide
support under the name of Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) [Int14,
MAB+13] – as well as for small micro-processors [SPP10, NAD+13, KSSV14,
EDFPT12]. Essentially, a Protected Module Architecture provides hardware
enforced memory access control that can be used to ensure that the state of a
protected module can only be accessed by the code of that protected module.
As a small representative example, consider the program in Figure 1. The
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static int tries_left = 3; 
static int PIN = 1234; 
static int secret = 666; 
int get_secret(int provided_pin) {
if (tries_left > 0) { 
if (PIN == provided_pin) {
tries_left = 3;
return secret;} 
else { tries_left-- ; return 0; }; }
else return 0; }
#include<stdio.h>
#include "secret.h"
// includes for other modules
void main() {
// code for main functionality
…
}
(a) The secret module
(b) Other modules of the program (c) Run-time memory contents
int get_secret(int provided_pin)
secret.c
secret.h
Machine code for 
main and other 
modules
Machine code for 
secret module
Static data for all 
modules (including 
PIN, tries_left, …) 
Heap (global)
Stack 
…
Machine code for 
main and other 
modules
Machine code for 
secret module
Static data for 
secret module
Heap (global)
Stack 
Static data for 
other modules
Protected 
Module
Entry point
(d) Run-time memory contents
when running under a PMA
Figure 1: A program with a security critical module, and how it looks in memory
at run-time with and without the protection of a Protected Module Architecture.
program has a single module (implemented in secret.c) that manages sensitive
information, in this case the secret variable that should only be shown to users of
the program who can provide a correct PIN. After three tries with an incorrect
PIN, the module will refuse further attempts to protect against brute force
attacks. The secret module exposes (in it’s header file secret.h) only the
get secret() function, and hence access to the global variables in secret.c is
restricted to the secret module at source code level. Other modules (including
for instance the main() function) can only interact with the module through
the get secret() function. This module is a very simple example of a security
critical module, like for instance the password manager in a browser or the
implementation of a cryptographic protocol. These modules can be subject to
memory scraping attacks.
To see this, consider the compiled version of this program at run-time.
Part (c) of Figure 1 shows a schematic picture of the memory contents at run-
time. If we now consider an attacker that can compromise some of the other
modules of the program, or that can compromise the operating system, it is
clear that the attacker can easily violate both integrity as well as confidentiality
of the variables of the secret module.
Part (d) of Figure 1 shows how the secret module could be loaded in a
protected module (or enclave). A protected module is essentially a segment of
memory, that can contain both code and data. In addition, the module has
one or more entry points1, that are code addresses in the protected module.
1Some protected module architectures support only one entry point, but then multiple
logical entry points can be layered on top of a single physical entry point.
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The memory access control model of protected module architectures essentially
enforces the following rules:
 When the Instruction Pointer (IP) is outside of the protected module,
access to memory in the protected module is prohibited.
 When the IP is inside a protected module, access to memory within that
module is allowed, but access to memory belonging to other protected
modules is still prohibited.
 The only way for the IP to enter a protected module is by jumping to one
of the designated entry points.
This simple access control model makes it possible for modules to guard access
to their private state. As shown in Part (d) of Figure 1, the secret module could
be compiled such that its machine code and its static data is stored within
the protected module. Depending on the exact compilation algorithm, other
state including for instance stack activation records for functions defined in the
module can also be stored in the protected module. If we provide a single entry
point to call the get secret() function, then the variables PIN, tries left
and secret can only be accessed by the get secret() function. Because of
the memory access control, they can no longer be “scraped” from memory by
malicious machine code in one of the other modules nor by kernel-level malware.
Given that Intel SGX is and will remain the dominant Protected Module
Architecture for the foreseeable future, we will use the term “enclave” for the
remainder of the paper.
3 Safe and unsafe modules
Safe languages protect against vulnerabilities within a module and Protected
Module Architectures guard modules against attacks from outside of the module.
Thus, it appears natural to combine both mechanisms. However, since the code
in an enclave is typically only part of a program, and since safe languages only
provide safety guarantees for whole programs written in that safe language,
enclaves that are programmed in safe languages are not necessarily safe.
Consider the following example module in the simple safe language intro-
duced in Section 2.1:
1 int count = 0 ;
2
3 void i n c ( ) {
4 count = count + 1 ;
5 }
6
7 int get count ( ) {
8 return count ;
9 }
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This implements a simple counter module where the context can only increment
the counter, or read it out. If one compiles this module to an enclave in the
way described in Section 2.2, the resulting module is safe in the sense that the
context can never drive it into undefined behavior (assuming that the source
code semantics specifies what should happen on integer overflow).
Now consider the following, somewhat more elaborate module:
1 int count = 0 ;
2 void (* obs ) ( int ) ;
3
4 void s e t o b s e r v e r (void o ( int ) ) {
5 obs = o ;
6 }
7
8 void i n c ( ) {
9 count = count + 1 ;
10 obs ( count ) ;
11 }
12
13 int get count ( ) {
14 return count ;
15 }
If this module is compiled as outlined in Section 2.2, it is not safe. The entry
point set_observer() accepts a function pointer as argument from the context.
If the context is malicious, it can pass in an invalid function pointer, and then
further behavior of the module will be undefined. By choosing the invalid func-
tion pointer carefully, an attacker could possibly succeed in making the module
misbehave. Suppose for instance that the compiler represents function pointers
as addresses of the start of the compiled code of the function. Then a malicious
context can pass in any address within the module and have the module start
executing code at that address on the call to obs(), thus launching a return-
oriented-programming style attack [Sha07, CDD+10] against the module. For
instance, if the module contains code like in Figure 1, such an attack could pass
in a function pointer that points into the middle of the get secret() function,
and hence executes this function while skipping the validation tests.
Issues similar to the example above (where the context provides invalid func-
tion pointers), can also occur when the context passes in data pointers (the
context could for instance tamper with the bounds information associated with
a data pointer), or object references. Additional complications arise when code
within the module reads from memory residing outside the module.
In this paper, we focus on the issue of handling invalid function pointers
only to illustrate the essence of the problem.
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4 Towards provably safe enclaves
Low-level attacks like the example above exist because of the abstraction gap
between the machine code level and the source code level. The key to defending
against these attacks is to make sure that any interaction that a malicious
context could have with a compiled module (running in an enclave) at the
machine code level will always have well-defined behavior according to the source
code level semantics.
Proving such safety requires us to (1) model the context-enclave interactions
at machine code level, (2) define the source code semantics modularly, and
(3) show that any context-enclave interaction at machine code level can be
interpreted as a source code level interaction for which the semantics defines
corresponding behavior. We address these three items in the following three
subsections.
4.1 Machine-code level context-enclave interactions
To ensure that behavior of an enclave is always well-defined, we have to make
sure that any potential interaction the context could have with the enclave is
covered by the definition of the semantics of the module that executes inside
the enclave. For our simple model of enclaves, the following interactions are
possible:
1. jump-in e(vi): jump from the context to an entry point e of the enclave,
with values vi in the processor registers. Assuming a 32-bit processor,
both e and the vi will be 32-bit words. i ranges from 0 to N − 1 where
N is the number of registers in the processor, and vi is the sequence of
values in these registers at the time of the jump.
2. jump-out a(vi): jump from within the enclave to an address a outside of
the module, with values vi in the processor registers.
3. read-out v = ∗a: read from within the enclave the contents of memory
at an address a outside of the module, resulting in value v.
4. write-out ∗a = v: write the value v from within the enclave to an address
a outside of the module.
Only jump-in interactions are initiated by the context, the other three are ini-
tiated by the enclave. For simplicity, we will limit our attention in this paper
to compilers that never perform read-out or write-out interactions. Handling
them is left for future work; the key additional challenge is to make sure that
data read from the context is checked as defensively as data passed into the mod-
ule by means of a jump-in event. Under this simplifying assumption, the only
possible interactions between enclave and context are jump-in or jump-out
interactions.
An enclave specification is a labeled transition system, consisting of:
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 A set ES of enclave states, the disjoint union of active enclave states AS
(the processor is executing in the enclave) and passive enclave states PS
(the processor is executing outside the enclave).
 A set of actions A, the disjoint union of entry actions jump-in e(vi), exit
actions jump-out a(vi) and τ (the internal action).
 A transition relation ⊂ ES ×A× ES, written E →α E′, such that:
– Entry actions transition from a passive state to an active state
– Exit actions transition from an active state to a passive state
– The internal action transitions from active states to active states
An enclave specification is safe (or complete), if the following holds:
 For any passive state P of the enclave, and for any entry action e, P
transitions under e to some (necessarily active) state A.
 If P transitions under e to A, A never gets stuck, i.e. either infinitely
performs τ actions, or will eventually perform an exit action.
Our objective is to make sure that a source code module defines a safe
or complete enclave specification: the behavior of the enclave on any (even
maliciously chosen) interaction with the context should follow from the source
code semantics or lead to a well-defined error state.
Note that this notion of safety guarantees the absence of low-level vulner-
abilities that are caused by undefined behavior, but it does not guarantee the
absence of (for instance) undesired information leaks from the enclave, or it does
not give any availability guarantees. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.
4.2 A modular semantics of the source code
Since enclaves only contain a single software module, not necessarily a whole
program, we have to define a modular semantics of the source language. A
good example of such a modular semantics is the trace-based semantics of Java
modules defined by Jeffrey and Rathke [JR05].
For our simple source language, we define the set of values2 to be the disjoint
union of (1) the signed 32-bit integers, (2) the value void, and (3) the set of
function values. The set of function values consists of the disjoint union of (1)
the function names of the functions defined in the module (the internal function
values), and (2) an infinite set of abstract external function values.
The modular semantics defines the source code level interactions that the
module can have with its source code context, and defines the traces of such
interactions that are considered valid behaviors of the module. For instance, in-
teractions for our simple language will be: (1) calls from the context of functions
2Note that we are now defining values at the level of the source code. These depend on
the source language and will usually be more abstract than values at machine code level.
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defined in the module (in-calls), (2) returns from such function calls (return-
outs), (3) calls from within the module to a function defined outside the module
(out-calls) and (4) returns from these calls (return-ins).
The semantics of a module M defines the valid traces of such interactions
for M . For instance, the following traces are valid traces of the simple Counter
module above:
 in-call inc(), return-out void, in-call get count(), return-out 1
 in-call inc(), return-out void, in-call inc(), return-out void,
in-call get count(), return-out 2.
The following trace is a valid trace for the Counter module with an observer,
where f1 is an external function value:
 in-call set observer(f1), return-out void, in-call inc(), out-call f1(1), return-
in void, return-out void
The definition of a formal modular semantics for our simple C dialect should
be a straightforward adaptation of the modular semantics for Java Jr. [JR05].
4.3 Defensive validation and interpretation of
context-enclave interactions as
source code interactions
Safety of an enclave requires well-defined reaction of the enclave to any jump-in
action, but the modular source code semantics only defines the reaction to (well-
typed) source-code level in-call or return-in actions. Therefore, the key to make
a compiled enclave safe is to define the machine-code level calling conventions,
and to defensively validate every jump-in action to make sure that under these
calling conventions the jump-in action can be interpreted as a well-typed source
code in-call or return-in.
For our simple language we define the following. A source code module will
be compiled to an enclave that has an entry point ef for each function f defined
in the module, and one additional entry point ereturn that we call the return
entry point. The calling convention to call function f with arity n will be to
jump to ef passing arguments to f in registers 0 to n−1, and the return address
in register n. For simplicity, we assume that the processor has a sufficiently large
number of registers. A return is performed by jumping from the module to the
specified return address, with the result value in register 0.
Now (assuming a 32-bit processor), we define how to interpret machine code
values (i.e. 32-bit words) as source code values of a specific expected type:
 Where the source module expects an integer value, the word is interpreted
as a signed 32-bit integer.
 Where the source module expects void, any 32-bit word is interpreted as
the value void.
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 Where the source module expects a function pointer of a specific type, the
word is interpreted as follows:
– If the word is an address outside the enclave, the word is interpreted
as an abstract external function value of the appropriate type.
– If the word is an address inside the enclave, then it is considered valid
only if it is equal to an entry point ef for a function f defined in the
module and of the appropriate type, and it is then interpreted as the
internal function value f .
Next, we define how low-level context-enclave interactions relate to source
code module interactions, making sure that any possible entry from the context
to the enclave (that could hence possibly be malicious) either finishes execution
with a run time error during validation, or can be related to a valid source code
level module entry.
 A jump-in e(vi) interaction correspond to source code interactions as
follows:
1. If e is the entry point ef corresponding to function f with arity n,
then v0 up to vn−1 are interpreted as source code values s0 to sn−1
as specified above using the signature of f to determine what source
code types to expect. If some of these values cannot be given a valid
interpretation, the jump-in interaction is interpreted as a run time
error.
Next, the word vn (the return address according to the calling con-
ventions) is checked to be an address outside the enclave. If this check
fails, the jump-in interaction is interpreted as a run time error. If
the check succeeds, then:
– this jump-in interaction corresponds to an in-call of f with ac-
tual parameters si, and
– vn is used as the address to jump to on completion of this in-
call. More precisely, when the source code semantics specifies
that the return-out corresponding to this in-call should happen,
the compiler will generate a jump-out event to address vn, with
the return value in the first register of the processor.
2. If e is the entry point ereturn, then v0 is interpreted as a source code
value s0 using the return type of the most recent out-call as the
expected source code type. If this interpretation is valid, the interac-
tion is interpreted as the return-in interaction with return value s0,
otherwise the jump-in interaction is interpreted as a run time error.
 When the source code semantics specifies that an out-call interaction
should happen, the compiler generates a jump-out a(vi) interaction where
a is the external function value (which is an address outside the enclave as
specified above), passing the values vi in the processor registers as actual
parameters, and the ereturn entry point as return address.
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Consider again the Counter with observer example. With the defensive
checks specified informally above in place, the module is now safe: if the context
provides an invalid function pointer within the module to the set observer()
function, this will lead to an immediate run time error, and hence launching a
return-oriented-programming style attack against the module is now also ruled
out. Of course, the context can still provide invalid external function pointers,
but these can only lead to undefined behavior in the context, never to undefined
behavior in the module.
4.4 Proving safety
Formalization of the problem, and proofs are work-in-progress. The steps re-
quired are:
1. Formalization of the source language. We should define a modular seman-
tics for the source, possibly also showing that this modular semantics is
compatible with pre-existing definitions of a whole program semantics.
2. Formalization of the algorithm for defensive validation of jump-in events
(informally described in Section 4.3).
3. A proof that the combination of this algorithm with the modular source
code semantics defines a safe enclave specification.
We are confident that the proofs work out for the case of the simple language
we considered in this paper, but significant challenges remain to address more
advanced language features. We intend to gradually extend the simple source
language with language features such as bounds-checked arrays, objects and
multi-threading, as well as with typing features such as ownership types.
5 Related Work
The work reported on in this paper is related to existing work on secure (fully
abstract) compilation, and work on language interoperability.
Fully abstract compilation [Aba99] studies the problem of compiling from
source languages to target languages (including, e.g. machine code) such that,
roughly speaking, attackers at the target level have no more power than attack-
ers at the source level. More formally, fully abstract compilation preserves and
reflects contextual equivalence. Fully abstract compilation has recently been
studied intensively [ASJP12, BA15, PAS+15, DPP16, JHA+15], including com-
pilation towards protected module architectures. Compared to our approach, a
fully abstract compiler provides strictly stronger guarantees. For instance, con-
fidentiality properties (like noninterference properties) are preserved by fully
abstract compilation, but not by our safe compiler. Yet, full abstraction is
much harder to achieve, and is a property of the entire compiler, whereas safety
can be proven without formalizing a full compiler. We also conjecture that safe
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compilers can be more efficient and would incur less runtime overhead on the
generated code than fully abstract compilers.
Work on language interoperability, foreign function interfaces or contracts
[MF07, FF02, AJP15, Ahm15] studies interoperability between different lan-
guages, but in most work the emphasis is either (1) on interoperability between
two safe languages where one is untyped and one is typed, and where contracts
check the interactions between the untyped and typed world, or (2) on interop-
erability (“plumbing”) between a safe language and a trusted unsafe language
that implements a native API for the safe language.
Finally, an important additional motivation for studying enclave safety is the
support for state continuity that researchers are developing [PLD+11, SJP14]. A
state-continuous enclave is protected from so-called rollback attacks that revert
the enclave’s internal state to a stale version of that state, but at the same time
state-continuous enclaves are enforced to process all their inputs and this can
be problematic if an input is provided that makes the enclave crash. Safety
of enclaves provides stronger assurance that the enclave implements sufficiently
defensive input checking.
6 Conclusion
Protected module architectures open the possibility to execute software modules
in enclaves and rely on a very small trusted computing base for their correct
execution. However, these architectures do not protect against vulnerabilities in
the modules themselves. We have reported on work in progress towards guaran-
teeing safety of protected enclaves, in the sense that the behavior of the enclave
at machine code level is fully determined by the source code for the enclave.
Although our approach provides weaker security guarantees than fully abstract
compilation, we expect that safe enclaves would execute more efficiently. This
enables the use of safe languages together with protected module architectures
in domains where the performance overhead would otherwise be prohibitive and
where the stronger guarantees provided by fully abstract compilation are not
required. Use cases in the fields of embedded computing, ubiquitous computing,
or the Internet of Things can benefit from safe enclaves.
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